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State University of New York
Abstract  This paper deals with derivation and estimation of the risk preference
function in the presence of output price uncertainty. The derivation depends nei-
ther on a specific parametric form of the utility function nor on any distribution
of output price. The risk preference function is flexible enough to test different
types of risk behavior (e.g., increasing, constant, and decreasing absolute risk
aversion). We also test for asymmetry in the distribution of output price, which
appears in the risk preference function. Moreover, we allow heterogeneity in
production technology. Parameters of production technology and risk preference
function are jointly estimated using the system of equations derived from the
first-order conditions of expected utility of profit maximization and the produc-
tion function. The estimated parameters of the risk preference function are used
to calculate absolute, relative, and downside risks for each producer. A panel
data on salmon farming from Norway is used as an application.
Key words  Price uncertainty, risk preference function, joint estimation, expected
utility, absolute risk aversion, downside risk aversion, Norwegian salmon.
Introduction
The theoretical literature on the effect of risk associated with output price uncer-
tainty on producers’ decisions regarding input demand and output supply is well de-
veloped. There is, however, a paucity of models that are easy to estimate and yet
flexible enough to accommodate the sufficiently general form of risk behavior of pro-
ducers. Flexibility in risk behavior is important from an empirical point of view because
risk preferences of producers affect estimates of input demand, output supply, tech-
nical change, total factor productivity growth, and returns to scale (Chambers 1983).
Since the risk preference function depends on the utility function, u(π ) (π  being
profit), and the distribution of output prices, the choice of utility functions and dis-
tributions of output price that yield a closed form solution are severely limited. This
paper proposes an alternative approach to derive the risk preference function. The
derivation depends neither on a specific parametric form of the utility function nor
any distribution of output price. It is based on a second order approximation of u′ (π )
[instead of assuming a parametric form of u′ (π )] and a specific probability distribu-
tion for the output price variable. The risk preference function can be made flexible
enough to test different types of risk behavior (e.g., increasing, constant, and de-
creasing absolute risk aversion). The model also allows one to test for asymmetry in
the distribution of output price, which appears in the risk preference function. The
main advantage of the approach proposed here is that all the parameters of the risk
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preference function are identified and estimated when a parametric form of the ab-
solute risk aversion function is assumed.
In this paper, our focus is on estimation of the production technology and risk
preference functions when farmers face output price uncertainty. For empirical ap-
plication we use data on a panel of Norwegian salmon farmers to estimate and test
several types of risk specifications. This particular application is interesting, since
producers in the salmon industry are subject to considerable price risk. There are
several sources of uncertainty in prices of farmed salmon. High volatility of salmon
prices is due to uncertainty associated with both demand and supply. These sources
are market driven as well as political. Supply of wild-caught Pacific salmon and
supply of farmed salmon are examples of market-driven risk that contribute to price
uncertainty. Political factors such as trade policy (e.g., tariffs and price restrictions
imposed by importing countries) and actions by private groups (e.g., boycott of Nor-
wegian salmon to protest Norwegian whaling, blockade of fishing trucks by protest-
ing fisherman in some importing countries, etc.) have contributed to salmon price
uncertainty in the past. In recent years, the European Union has imposed restrictions
on the quantity of salmon Norway can export to the member countries. Productivity
gain, reduction in input cost, public R&D investment, etc., contributed to a decline
in salmon prices (Asche 1997). The Norwegian Fish Farmers’ Association (NFF),
which represents most of the fish farms in Norway, has stated several times that risk
reduction in fish farming is a high priority task (see NFF 1990, p. 10).1
We estimate the model using a parametric form of the production technology.
The first-order conditions of expected utility maximization, which bring risk prefer-
ences into the analysis, are also used in estimation along with the production tech-
nology. These equations are estimated jointly thereby taking endogeneity of variable
inputs into account. From the estimated risk preference function, one could obtain
estimates of absolute, relative, and downside risk aversion functions for each pro-
ducer. Empirical results show the presence of decreasing absolute risk aversion and
symmetric distribution of output price in Norwegian salmon farming.
Modeling Risk Preferences
We assume that the objective of firms is to maximize expected utility of anticipated
profit, u(π ), where u(π ) is a continuous and differentiable function π . Anticipated
profit, π , is defined as:
π= − ⋅ − py w x C e
f , (1)
where pe is anticipated price of output, y. Firm production technology is represented
by y = Af(x, z, t) in which x and z are variable and quasi-fixed input vectors, and t is
the time trend variable. Heterogeneity in the production technology is introduced
through the firm-specific parameter A. The parameters in f(.) are common to all
firms. The vector of variable input price is w, and Cf denotes cost of fixed/quasi-
fixed inputs. Following Zellner, Kmenta, and Dreze 1966), we assume that pe = pen,
which implies that E(pe) = pE(en) = p when E(en) = 1 and p is the observed output
price. Variance of en is assumed to be constant.
The first-order conditions of expected utility of profit maximization can be written as:
1 Furthermore, a number of stochastic biophysical factors make the production process in salmon farm-
ing risky. Salmon farming is more risky than most other types of meat production due to the salmon’s
high susceptibility to the marine environment it is reared in. Kumbhakar and Tveterås (2001) addressed
these issues in a paper in which production risk and risk preferences are modeled.Risk Preferences and Technology 79
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which can be expressed as:
A f wp wp jj j
s () ( ) ( ) , ⋅= ⋅ + [] ≡ 111 θ (2)
where θ  = Cov{u′ (π ), en/E[u′ (π )]}is the risk preference function,2 ps = p(1 + θ ), and fj(·)
= [∂ f(·)/∂ xj]. If producers were risk neutral, θ  would be zero. In such a case, maximiza-
tion of expected utility of profit would be identical to maximization of expected profit.
Derivation of the Risk Preference Function
Since we are interested in estimating the risk preference function, the most impor-
tant task is to derive an algebraic form of θ  that is easy to implement
econometrically and imposes minimum restrictions on the structure of risk prefer-
ences of the individual producers. In general, the risk preference function, θ  defined
in equation (2), is a function of the parameters of the utility function, probability
distribution of η , and data on inputs and output quantities. It is possible to derive an
explicit form of θ  if (i) some particular forms of u(·) are chosen and (ii) some spe-
cific distributions on η  are assumed. Choices of (i) and (ii) are very much limited in
practice.3 Here we propose an alternative solution, which requires specification of
neither any utility function (at least directly) nor any distributional assumption on η .
PROPOSITION 1: If u(·) is continuous and differentiable, and u′ (π ) = u′ (µ π  + σ π z) is
approximated by a second order polynomial around z = 0, then the risk preference
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In the above formulation, π  = pyeη  – w · x – Cf is rewritten as π  = µ π  + σ π  · z, where
the mean and standard deviation of profit are µ π  = {py – w · x – Cf} and σ π  = py.β .
The random variable z = (en – 1)/β  has a zero mean and unit variance where β 2 =
var(en). AR is the Arrow-Pratt measure of the absolute risk aversion coefficient [i.e.,
2 The first-order conditions in equation (2) are somewhat different from those derived and presented in
Kumbhakar and Tveterås (2001). Although the risk preference function has the same interpretation, it’s
driven by production risk in Kumbhakar and Tveterås. Consequently, the effect of output price uncer-
tainty and output risk on input demand is different. By comparing the two sets of first-order conditions,
one can easily see this difference.
3 Following Love and Buccola (1991), if one assumes u(·) to be exponential and η  normally distributed, or
u(·) expo-power and η  follow the weibull distribution (Saha, Shumway, and Tolpaz 1994), it is possible to
derive an analytical form for θ . Estimation is, however, a problem in both cases. The approach by Chavas and
Holt 1996) does not require specification and estimation of θ  directly. It does assume parametric utility and
production functions. The method relies heavily on numerical methods, and therefore, estimation can be a
real burden if one wants to try more than one form of utility and production functions.
4 Kumbhakar and Tveterås (2001) derived a similar result based on a model that includes Just-Pope
(1978) type production risk.Kumbhakar 80
AR = –u″ (π )/u′ (π )], and DR is the downside risk aversion coefficient [i.e., DR =
u″′ (π )/u′ (π )]. Finally, γ  measures the skewness of eη  [i.e., γ  = E(z3)].
From an empirical point of view, the main advantage of the above result is that
one needs to specify only the AR function to estimate θ  [since DR = (∂ AR/∂µ π ) +
AR2]. Consequently, a wide variety of parametric forms for AR can be used without
knowing the exact form of the underlying utility function. It is to be noted that all
the parameters in θ  can be identified, except when AR is a constant and DR ≈  0.
Several important features of θ  and some special cases of interest are:
(i) γ  = 0, which means that the distribution of output price is symmetric. Such a
hypothesis can be empirically tested.
(ii) Constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA), and increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) hypotheses can be
tested by specifying an appropriate form of AR. For example, if AR = c0 + c1 µ π
then c1 = 0, positive, negative, will imply CARA, IARA, and DARA, respec-
tively. Finally, if c1 = c0 = 0 then producers are risk neutral. Some other non-
linear functional forms on AR can also be used to parameterize and test differ-
ent forms of risk references. Although the AR function is linear, the risk prefer-
ence function is highly non-linear.
(iii) Since DR = (∂ AR/∂µ π ) + AR it is not necessary to specify any functional form
on DR, and no additional parameters are involved in DR. If AR is firm-specific,
so is DR.
(iv) Relative risk aversion function (RR = AR.µ π ) is firm-specific with or without
AR being firm-specific. (v) All the parameters in θ  are identified, including β
and γ . This is also true even if γ  = 0. When DR is close to zero so that θ  = –
AR.β 2.py , then β  is not identified.
(iv) It is possible (a) to accommodate higher order terms in the approximation of
u′ (π ) around z = 0, and (b) specify a variety of functional forms for AR. Al-
though a functional form on AR indirectly implies some functional forms for
the utility function, it is not necessary to have an analytical solution for the un-
derlying utility function for every specification of AR.
If a firm is risk averse, then θ  < 0 , which, in turn, implies that the relevant out-
put price is less than observed price (i.e., ps < p). Consequently, the presence of out-
put price uncertainty reduces demand for inputs and supply of output for a risk ad-
verse firm (Blair and Lusky 1975). More generally, it can be seen from equation (2)
that input demand, and hence output supply, will depend on risk preferences, θ , as
well as firm-effects, A. Thus, if firm-effects are assumed to be random, input vari-
ables in the production function cannot be independent of the random firm compo-
nents (in a one-way error component panel data model) of the production function.
Consequently, the parameter estimates obtained from a single equation production
function will be biased and inconsistent.
Data
The model outlined in the previous section is estimated using panel data on 28 Nor-
wegian salmon farms observed during 1985–92. Norway has long been the world
leader in farmed salmon production (Bjørndal 1990; Asche 2001). Salmon farming
is a relatively young industry. Small-scale salmon farming started in the 1970s, but
5 I am grateful to R. Tveterås for allowing use of some of his data presented in his doctoral dissertation.
Details on the sample and construction of the variables used here can be found in Tveterås (1997).Risk Preferences and Technology 81
most farms were established in the 1980s.
Since 1982, the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries has compiled salmon farm
production data. In the present study, we use a balanced panel of 28 such farms ob-
served during 1985–92.5 The output variable (y) is sales (in 1,000 kilograms) of
salmon and the change in stock of fish (in 1,000 kilograms). The input variables are:
feed, stock of fish, labor, and capital. Feed is a composite measure of salmon feed
measured in thousand kilograms. Fish input is the stock of fish (measured in thou-
sand kilograms) at the beginning of the year (January 1st). The stock of fish is mea-
sured as the total biomass of live fish in the pens on the first of January. Labor is
total hours of work (in 1,000 hours). Capital is the replacement value (in real terms)
of pens, buildings, feeding equipment, etc. Price of salmon is the market price of
salmon per kilogram in real NOK. The wage rate (in real NOK) is obtained by divid-
ing labor cost by hours of hired labor. Price of feed is similarly obtained by dividing
expenditure on feed by the quantity. Summary statistics of these variables are given
in table 1 by year. Production of salmon increased, while prices decreased during
this period. Labor hours declined after attaining a peak in 1990. Real wages in-
creased very little during this period. Capital use increased substantially up to 1990.
It then declined in the last two years. The fish input figures show a decline in the
last year. In the present study, we are treating labor and feed as variable inputs. Fish
and capital are treated as quasi-fixed inputs (z), primarily because it is difficult to
construct price data for fish stock and capital from the information in the data set.
Estimation and Results
Model Specification and Estimation
We assume that the production technology is represented by a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion, viz.,





=+ + + ∑ ∑ αβ α (4)
where A = exp (µ ), µ  being fixed firm-effects (constant over time). Using the pro-
duction function in equation (4), the first-order conditions of expected utility of
profit maximization in equation (2) can be expressed as:
Table 1
Summary Values
Year Output Labor Feed Fish Capital Price Feed Price Wage
1985 195.634 7.770 201.277 82.146 2,231.900 60.553 15.610 108.188
1986 222.840 8.124 206.015 105.511 2,718.350 47.309 10.119 109.622
1987 251.491 7.835 242.425 100.151 3,023.600 47.765 9.974 115.200
1988 352.403 8.930 370.264 123.365 3,467.320 44.642 8.933 122.079
1989 470.981 9.175 459.975 197.841 4,007.350 35.872 10.486 128.556
1990 472.233 9.389 455.276 232.955 4,133.470 32.389 10.982 110.939
1991 457.234 8.226 390.690 216.216 3,731.270 29.460 9.731 122.180
1992 467.072 8.165 471.699 206.639 3,408.810 29.784 9.612 136.219
Mean 361.236 8.452 349.703 158.103 3,340.259 40.972 10.681 119.123
Std. Dev. 121.585 0.623 116.175 60.963 650.651 10.958 2.082 9.939Kumbhakar 82
ln ln ln( ) ln( ) ln , , , . yx w p j J jj j −= − + − = … 11 θα  (5)
These equations can be used, in principle, to solve for ln y and ln xj. In equa-
tions (4) and (5), we have a system of (J + 1) equations in (J + 1) endogenous vari-
ables y, x1, …, xj). Since θ  is a highly non-linear function of y and x, analytical solu-
tions of input demand and output supply functions are not possible, even for the
Cobb-Douglas case. It is, however, clear that input demand and output supply will
be reduced if θ  < 0.
It is worth noting here that the risk-preference function does not appear directly
in the production function in equation (4). Thus, direct estimation (single equation
technique) of the production function in equation (4) does not yield any information
on risk-preference behavior of firms. In fact, direct estimation of the production
function in equation (4) might be inappropriate, given that some of the inputs ap-
pearing on the right-hand side of the equation are endogenous.
Depending on the specification of AR, a variety of risk-preference behavior can
be tested in the model outlined in equations (4) and (5). Here, we report results from
five models. Each of these models consists of the production function in equation
(4) and the first-order conditions in equation (5). Models 1-4 take risk into account,
while Model 5 assumes that salmon farmers are risk neutral. In Model 1, we specify



















where DR = –c1 + AR2, h1 = 1/β 2 = 1/var(eη ), h2 = βγ . Symmetry in eη  can be tested
from γ  = 0 ⇒  h2 = 0. Risk neutrality can be tested from c0 = c1 = 0. Finally, CARA,
DARA, and IARA hypotheses can be tested from c1 = 0, < 0, and > 0, respectively.
Model 2 restricts γ  = 0 thereby imposing symmetry restrictions on the distribu-
tion of output price. On the other hand, Model 3 assumes CARA, but allows γ  to be
non-zero. Finally, Model 4 assumes γ  = 0 as well as AR constant (CARA). Conse-
quently, Model 4 is a special case of Models 2 and 1. Since Models 2-4 are nested in
Model 1, we use the likelihood ratio (LR) test to select the best model. Finally,
Model 5 assumes farmers to be risk neutral. Thus, Model 5 becomes a special case
of Models 1-4.
To estimate Models 1-5, we append error terms to the production function and
each of the J first-order conditions. The error term in the production function speci-
fied in equation (4) is assumed to have zero mean and constant variance, while those
in the first-order conditions [given in equation (5)] are allowed to have non-zero
mean (varying across farms) but constant variances.6 The error terms in equations
(4) and (5) are, however, freely correlated among themselves. Since the equations in
equations (4) and (5) constitute a simultaneous equation system in which the output
and some inputs are endogenous, we used a system approach to estimate each of the
models. Each model is estimated using both nonlinear iterative 3SLS and the FIML
methods. The FIML results are not much different from the 3SLS results. We report
the FIML results in table 2.
6 The hypothesis that the error vector in equation (5) has zero mean for all farms is accepted in each
model by the likelihood ratio test at the 5% level of significance.Risk Preferences and Technology 83
Results
In table 2, we first report the production function parameters (input coefficients) fol-
lowed by the parameters of the risk preference function. Estimates of input coeffi-
cients (elasticities) in Models 1-4 are quite similar. However, these coefficients are
somewhat different from those in Model 5, which is estimated based on the assump-
tion that the farmers are risk neutral. Thus, Model 5 ignores the risk terms in equa-
tion (5) — the first order conditions. The labor and feed coefficients in Model 5 are
lower compared to those from Models 1-4. On the other hand, the capital coefficient
in Model 5 is too big compared to those in Models 1-4. The coefficient on the time
trend variable (which is interpreted as exogenous technical change) is found to be
almost identical in all five models.
Since we used a Cobb-Douglas production function in all models, returns to scale
(RTS) results are constant over time and across farms. RTS estimates are quite stable
across Models 1-5 (0.806, 0.826, 0.824, 0.825, and 0.816, respectively). Thus, we find
evidence of decreasing returns to scale in salmon farming from all five models.
We now examine the parameters of the risk preference function θ . These param-
eters are: c0 and c1 in the AR function (in Models 1 and 2) and β , and γ  (in Models 1
and 3). In Model 1, all of these parameters are significant at the 1% level of signifi-
cance, except γ . Although the distribution of output price is found to be positively
skewed, the hypothesis that γ  = 0 (meaning the distribution of output price is sym-
metric) is accepted at the 5% level of significance using the asymptotic t and LR
tests. Both the c0 and c1 coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1u″ %
level of significance. Since c1 < 0 and statistically significant, we find evidence in
support of DARA hypothesis. In Model 2, we restrict γ  = 0. Both the c0 and c1 coef-
ficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level of significance. Further-
more, c1 < 0 and is statistically significant. This result supports the DARA hypothesis as
well. Model 3 assumes constant absolute risk aversion (i.e., c1 = 0), but allows asymme-
try in the distribution of output price (i.e., γ  ≠  0). The γ  coefficient is found to be posi-
tive, but not significantly different from zero at the 5% level of significance. How-
ever, the LR test (c1 = 0) rejects Model 3 when tested against Model 1. Finally, in
Model 4 we use a CARA specification with γ  = 0. The LR test accepts γ  = 0 when
comparing between Models 3 and 4. Thus in Model 4, the CARA hypothesis is re-
jected but the symmetry hypothesis (γ  = 0) is not. Finally, Model 5 assumes risk-
neutrality, which is rejected by the LR test against Models 1-4 at the 1% level of
significance. In view of these results, we find Model 2 to be the preferred model.
Table 2
Parameter Estimates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Parameter Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
α L 0.082 7.589 0.087 10.141 0.082 7.515 0.082 9.739 0.063 11.302
β K 0.075 2.800 0.069 2.795 0.084 3.170 0.083 3.350 0.123 3.705
β F 0.333 8.170 0.356 16.068 0.332 8.103 0.333 14.257 0.242 21.825
β FS 0.315 15.717 0.313 16.398 0.326 16.380 0.326 16.955 0.388 19.061
RTS 0.806 10.203 0.826 13.152 0.824 12.671 0.825 13.047 0.816 15.096
α T 0.052 9.402 0.051 10.299 0.051 9.236 0.051 10.083 0.053 7.624
c0 4.481 2.557 5.920 6.096 5.6033 1.990 5.715 4.567 — —
c1 –1.392 –2.141 –1.842 –3.722 — — — — — —
β 2 0.848 2.869 0.704 4.026 0.452 2.399 0.448 3.384 — —
γ 0.159 0.743 — — 0.011 0.036 — — — —Kumbhakar 84
The estimated values of the risk preference function, θ , are found to be negative
in all four models at every data point. This means that all salmon farmers are risk
averse. However, the degree of risk-aversion (magnitude of θ ) varies among farms,
as well as over time. Instead of reporting the θ  values, we report the absolute, rela-
tive risk, and downside risk aversion for each farm (whenever applicable).
Although we find Model 2 to be the preferred model, we report different measures
of risk aversion for all five models to check robustness of results due to model
misspecification. We report predicted values of the AR function by farm in table 3.
These are the mean values (over time) of AR. The AR values are all positive, thereby
indicating that all farms are risk averse. The larger values of AR imply stronger aversion
to risk. It can be seen from the table that in each model the AR values are not much dif-
ferent among farms. Part of the reason is that these values are the mean values of AR
(over time) for each farm. The minimum and maximum values of the AR function are
0.30 and 6.42 (in Model 1) and 0.39 and 8.47 (in Model 2). The overall mean values of
AR in Models 1 and 2 are 3.22 and 4.25, respectively. Thus, there are substantial varia-
tions in the degree of salmon producers’ attitudes towards risk aversion.
Predicted values of the relative risk aversion (RR) function are reported by farm
in table 4. Again, a positive value of RR indicates risk aversion, and larger values of
Table 3
Predicted Values of Absolute Risk Aversion (AR) Function by Farm
Model 1 Model 2
No. AR t-value AR t-value
Farm 1 3.25 13.74 4.29 13.72
Farm 2 3.25 13.73 4.28 13.71
Farm 3 3.53 14.91 4.65 14.89
Farm 4 2.57 10.85 3.38 10.83
Farm 5 2.39 10.09 3.15 10.07
Farm 6 3.15 13.33 4.16 13.31
Farm 7 3.49 14.75 4.6 14.73
Farm 8 3.54 14.96 4.67 14.94
Farm 9 2.69 11.39 3.55 11.37
Farm 10 2.75 11.61 3.62 11.59
Farm 11 3.14 13.27 4.14 13.25
Farm 12 3.32 14.06 4.39 14.04
Farm 13 3.17 13.41 4.18 13.39
Farm 14 3.64 15.38 4.8 15.36
Farm 15 3.02 12.77 3.98 12.75
Farm 16 3.51 14.85 4.63 14.83
Farm 17 3.67 15.52 4.84 15.5
Farm 18 3.44 14.54 4.54 14.52
Farm 19 3.62 15.31 4.78 15.29
Farm 20 2.79 11.78 3.67 11.76
Farm 21 3.69 15.61 4.87 15.59
Farm 22 2.98 12.58 3.92 12.56
Farm 23 2.88 12.19 3.8 12.17
Farm 24 3.65 15.45 4.82 15.43
Farm 25 2.97 12.56 3.92 12.54
Farm 26 3.43 14.49 4.52 14.47
Farm 27 3.62 15.29 4.77 15.27
Farm 28 3.06 12.93 4.03 12.91
Mean 3.22 4.25Risk Preferences and Technology 85
RR imply a stronger degree of risk aversion. The main difference between the RR
and the AR measure is in the scale. Another difference between the AR and the RR
values is that the RR values are both farm- and time-specific, even if the AR values
are firm- and time-invariant. The RR measure might be preferred because it is a
unit-free measure. Similar to the AR measure, we do not see much difference in the
RR values among farms, primarily because these values are mean (over time) for
each farm. The mean values of RR for the entire sample in Models 1-4 are: 2.55,
3.36, 5.08, and 5.19, respectively.
Predicted values of the downside risk aversion (DR) function corresponding to
Models 1 and 2 are reported in table 5. Producers are averse to downside risk if they
“ ... generally avoid situations which offer the potential for substantial gains but
which also leave them even slightly vulnerable to losses below some critical level”
(Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler 1980, p. 921). Alternatively, when there is a choice
between two profit distributions with the same mean and variance, they will prefer
the profit distribution that is less skewed to the left. Thus, a positive value of DR
would indicate that individual producers are averse to downside risk. In both mod-
els, the DR values are found to be positive and statistically significant. A positive
value of DR indicates averse to downside risk. This result is expected, since we find
Table 4
Predicted Values of Relative Risk Aversion (RR) Function by Farm
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. RR t-value RR t-value RR t-value RR t-value
Farm 1 2.45 5.90 3.23 5.89 4.97 5.23 5.07 5.23
Farm 2 2.51 6.03 3.31 6.03 4.98 5.24 5.08 5.24
Farm 3 2.08 5.01 2.75 5.01 3.86 4.06 3.94 4.06
Farm 4 3.25 7.83 4.29 7.82 7.71 8.12 7.87 8.12
Farm 5 2.34 5.64 3.08 5.63 8.44 8.88 8.60 8.88
Farm 6 2.92 7.02 3.85 7.02 5.36 5.64 5.47 5.64
Farm 7 1.44 3.45 1.89 3.45 4.01 4.22 4.09 4.22
Farm 8 2.39 5.74 3.15 5.74 3.81 4.01 3.88 4.01
Farm 9 3.32 8.00 4.38 7.99 7.20 7.58 7.35 7.58
Farm 10 2.82 6.78 3.71 6.77 6.99 7.36 7.13 7.36
Farm 11 2.93 7.05 3.86 7.05 5.41 5.70 5.52 5.70
Farm 12 2.56 6.17 3.38 6.17 4.67 4.91 4.76 4.91
Farm 13 2.91 6.99 3.83 6.99 5.28 5.56 5.39 5.56
Farm 14 2.13 5.12 2.81 5.12 3.41 3.59 3.48 3.59
Farm 15 2.98 7.18 3.93 7.17 5.89 6.20 6.01 6.20
Farm 16 2.28 5.49 3.01 5.49 3.91 4.12 3.99 4.12
Farm 17 2.10 5.06 2.78 5.06 3.28 3.45 3.35 3.45
Farm 18 2.48 5.97 3.27 5.97 4.21 4.43 4.29 4.43
Farm 19 2.10 5.05 2.77 5.05 3.47 3.66 3.54 3.66
Farm 20 3.35 8.05 4.41 8.05 6.84 7.19 6.97 7.19
Farm 21 1.97 4.73 2.59 4.73 3.19 3.36 3.25 3.36
Farm 22 3.05 7.35 4.03 7.35 6.07 6.39 6.19 6.39
Farm 23 2.30 5.53 3.03 5.52 6.44 6.78 6.57 6.78
Farm 24 2.10 5.06 2.77 5.06 3.35 3.52 3.41 3.52
Farm 25 3.04 7.31 4.00 7.30 6.09 6.41 6.21 6.41
Farm 26 2.38 5.73 3.14 5.73 4.26 4.48 4.34 4.48
Farm 27 2.13 5.13 2.81 5.13 3.50 3.68 3.57 3.68
Farm 28 3.02 7.27 3.98 7.27 5.74 6.04 5.85 6.04
Mean 2.55 3.36 5.08 5.19Kumbhakar 86
evidence in support of DARA hypothesis that implies u″′ (·) > 0, thereby indicating
that producers are averse to downside risk (Pratt 1964). The magnitude of DR values
differs among farms within and between models. The DR values in Model 2 (the
preferred model) are much higher compared to those in Model 1. The overall mean
of DR values in Models 1 and 2 are 12.30 and 20.81, respectively.
Farm-effects often reflect differences in either managerial ability (Mundlak
1961) or technical efficiency (Schmidt and Sickles 1984) among farms. Some un-
measured fixed effects can also explain the inter-farm productivity differential.
These effects might contribute to heterogeneity in farm production technology. We
report the farm-effects in Appendix A. Although the magnitude of these farm-effects
is quite similar, the hypothesis that there is no farm-heterogeneity (µ i = µ , ∀ i) is re-
jected at the 5% level of significance. Farm-effects are found to be almost identical
in Models 3 and 4. To the extent these farm-effects reflect technical efficiency, one
can, following Schmidt and Sickles (1984), calculate relative efficiency of these
farms (treating the best farm 100% efficient). These relative efficiencies are re-
ported in Appendix B. The mean efficiency levels are in the range of 80% (Model 5)
to 86% (Models 1-2). The same farm (No. 5) is identified as the best in every model.
This is also true for the worst farm (No. 27). Correlation coefficients of efficiency
Table 5
Predicted Values of DR Coefficients by Farm
Model 1 Model 2
No. DR t-value DR t-value
Farm 1 12.56 8.27 21.26 8.04
Farm 2 12.47 8.21 21.10 7.98
Farm 3 14.31 9.43 24.32 9.19
Farm 4 8.37 5.51 13.97 5.28
Farm 5 8.84 5.82 14.79 5.59
Farm 6 11.47 7.55 19.36 7.32
Farm 7 15.05 9.91 25.61 9.68
Farm 8 13.95 9.19 23.68 8.95
Farm 9 8.85 5.83 14.80 5.59
Farm 10 9.79 6.45 16.44 6.21
Farm 11 11.39 7.50 19.23 7.27
Farm 12 12.74 8.39 21.57 8.16
Farm 13 11.57 7.62 19.54 7.39
Farm 14 14.75 9.72 25.09 9.48
Farm 15 10.79 7.10 18.17 6.87
Farm 16 13.98 9.20 23.73 8.97
Farm 17 14.93 9.83 25.39 9.60
Farm 18 13.36 8.80 22.67 8.57
Farm 19 14.72 9.69 25.03 9.46
Farm 20 9.22 6.07 15.46 5.84
Farm 21 15.22 10.03 25.90 9.79
Farm 22 10.48 6.90 17.65 6.67
Farm 23 11.13 7.33 18.77 7.10
Farm 24 14.86 9.78 25.27 9.55
Farm 25 10.49 6.91 17.66 6.67
Farm 26 13.45 8.86 22.82 8.63
Farm 27 14.65 9.65 24.90 9.41
Farm 28 10.91 7.18 18.39 6.95
Mean 12.30 20.81Risk Preferences and Technology 87
rankings among models (in pairs) are found to be very high (the minimum being
0.96 and the maximum 0.99).
Summary and Conclusions
This paper introduces a new approach to derive the risk preference function in the
presence of output price uncertainty. The distinguishing feature of the present ap-
proach is that we do not use any parametric form of the utility function, yet the
model is quite flexible in accommodating different types of risk behavior. All the pa-
rameters of the risk preference function are identified and estimated when a parametric
form of the absolute risk aversion (AR) function is assumed. Although an assumption on
the form of the AR function implies some underlying utility function, the main advan-
tage of the approach used in the paper is that one does not have to specify a parametric
form of AR function for which there is an explicit analytical form of the underlying util-
ity function. Consequently, a variety of functional forms for risk preferences can be es-
timated and tested. From the estimated risk preference function, one can easily ob-
tain predicted values of absolute, relative, and downside risk aversion functions.
In estimating the risk preference function, we take into account heterogeneity in
production technology and use a system of equations consisting of the production func-
tion and the first-order conditions of expected utility of profit. Thus, endogeneity of the
variable inputs is explicitly taken into account. The resulting system of equations,
mainly those derived from the first-order conditions of expected utility of profit maximi-
zation, is nonlinear and can be estimated either using the 3SLS or FIML technique. The
model is estimated using a panel of 28 Norwegian salmon farms observed during 1985–
92. Four separate variants of the risk preference function with a different specification of
AR functions (Models 1-4) are considered. We find that all salmon farms are risk averse.
Furthermore, we find that farmers’ risk preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk
aversion. The hypothesis of risk neutrality is rejected by the data in all four models. All
three risk aversion measures (absolute, relative, and downside) are found to vary sub-
stantially among farms. We also find evidence of farm heterogeneity in the production
technology. Farm-efficiency rankings across different models are found to be highly cor-
related. This result might be used to assert that the estimates of risk aversion functions
are not driven by the choice of a particular form of the production function.
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Appendix A
Estimates of Farm Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
No. Effects t-value Effects t-value Effects t-value Effects t-value Effects t-value
Farm 1 2.69 5.32 2.48 6.20 2.45 5.04 2.44 6.20 2.44 5.05
Farm 2 2.75 5.59 2.54 6.63 2.51 5.29 2.50 6.61 2.52 5.48
Farm 3 2.70 5.59 2.50 6.63 2.47 5.30 2.46 6.64 2.48 5.51
Farm 4 2.74 5.43 2.53 6.32 2.50 5.15 2.49 6.32 2.52 5.25
Farm 5 2.81 5.34 2.60 6.21 2.58 5.08 2.57 6.24 2.63 5.20
Farm 6 2.78 5.52 2.57 6.60 2.55 5.26 2.54 6.64 2.60 5.63
Farm 7 2.61 5.13 2.41 5.90 2.37 4.84 2.37 5.89 2.34 4.74
Farm 8 2.63 5.35 2.43 6.25 2.40 5.06 2.39 6.26 2.36 5.00
Farm 9 2.59 5.07 2.39 5.87 2.35 4.77 2.35 5.85 2.37 4.82
Farm 10 2.68 5.33 2.47 6.25 2.45 5.04 2.44 6.25 2.47 5.15
Farm 11 2.62 5.37 2.42 6.25 2.39 5.07 2.38 6.23 2.35 4.97
Farm 12 2.60 5.25 2.39 6.09 2.36 4.95 2.35 6.10 2.33 4.86
Farm 13 2.62 5.19 2.42 6.07 2.39 4.90 2.38 6.09 2.40 5.01
Farm 14 2.57 5.20 2.36 6.15 2.33 4.89 2.32 6.15 2.31 4.92
Farm 15 2.60 5.19 2.40 6.09 2.37 4.88 2.36 6.06 2.36 4.94
Farm 16 2.64 5.50 2.44 6.52 2.40 5.19 2.39 6.52 2.37 5.21
Farm 17 2.67 5.66 2.46 6.79 2.44 5.37 2.43 6.80 2.42 5.58
Farm 18 2.56 5.16 2.36 5.95 2.32 4.86 2.31 5.93 2.28 4.67
Farm 19 2.61 5.24 2.40 6.13 2.38 4.96 2.37 6.17 2.37 5.00
Farm 20 2.68 5.41 2.48 6.33 2.44 5.12 2.43 6.32 2.45 5.19
Farm 21 2.74 5.70 2.54 6.83 2.50 5.40 2.49 6.82 2.46 5.51
Farm 22 2.63 5.18 2.42 6.06 2.40 4.91 2.39 6.05 2.41 5.03
Farm 23 2.67 5.22 2.46 6.02 2.43 4.93 2.42 5.96 2.44 4.93
Farm 24 2.67 5.39 2.46 6.36 2.44 5.07 2.43 6.31 2.41 5.00
Farm 25 2.64 5.27 2.44 6.11 2.40 4.99 2.39 6.10 2.37 4.91
Farm 26 2.64 5.42 2.43 6.31 2.40 5.18 2.39 6.42 2.39 5.28
Farm 27 2.47 4.97 2.27 5.73 2.23 4.65 2.22 5.70 2.14 4.42
Farm 28 2.62 5.09 2.41 5.95 2.38 4.81 2.37 5.96 2.40 4.91
Mean 2.65 2.45 2.41 2.41 2.41Risk Preferences and Technology 89
Appendix B
Estimates of Relative Efficiency
No. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Farm 1 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.83
Farm 2 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.90
Farm 3 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.86
Farm 4 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.90
Farm 5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Farm 6 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Farm 7 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.75
Farm 8 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.76
Farm 9 0.80 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.77
Farm 10 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.85
Farm 11 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.76
Farm 12 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.74
Farm 13 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.79
Farm 14 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.73
Farm 15 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.76
Farm 16 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.77
Farm 17 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.81
Farm 18 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.70
Farm 19 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.77
Farm 20 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.84
Farm 21 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.84
Farm 22 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.80
Farm 23 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.83
Farm 24 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.80
Farm 25 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.77
Farm 26 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.79
Farm 27 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.61
Farm 28 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.79
Mean 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.80